Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Battaglini, Marco Author-Name-First: Battaglini Author-Name-Last: Marco Author-Email: mb2457@cornell.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Cornell University and EIEF Author-Name: Lai, Ernest K Author-Name-First:Ernest K. Author-Name-Last: Lai Author-Email: kwl409@lehigh.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Lehigh University Author-Name: Wooyoung Lim Author-Name-First: Wooyoung Author-Name-Last: Lim Author-Email: wooyoung@ust.hk Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Author-Name: Joseph Tao-yi Wang Author-Name-First: Joseph Tao-yi Author-Name-Last: Wang Author-Email: josephw@ntu.edu.tw Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, National Taiwan University Title: The Informational Theory of Legislative Committees: An Experimental Analysis Abstract: We experimentally investigate the informational theory of legislative committees first proposed by Gilligan and Krehbiel [1987, 1989]. Two committees provide policy-relevant information to a legislature under two different procedural rules. Under the open rule, the legislature is free to make any decision; under the closed rule, the legislature is constrained to choose between a committee's proposal and an exogenous status quo. Our experiment shows that even in the presence of conflicts of interests, legislative committees help improve the legislature's decision by providing useful information. We further obtain evidence in support of three theoretical predictions: the Outlier Principle, according to which more extreme preferences of the committees reduce the extent of information transmission; the Distributional Principle, according to which the open rule is more distributionally eefficient than the closed rule; and the Restrictive-rule Principle, according to which the closed rule better facilitates the informational role of legislative committees. We, however, obtain mixed evidence for the Heterogeneity Principle, according to which more information can be extracted in the presence of multiple committees with heterogeneous preferences. Our experimental findings provide overall support for the equilibrium predictions of Gilligan and Krehbiel [1989], some of which have been controversial in the literature. Length: 61 pages Creation-Date: 2016-05 Revision-Date: 2016-05 Publication-Status: Published in Review of Economics, March 1999, pages 1-23 File-URL: https://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S000305541800059X File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: First version, 2016 File-URL: https://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S000305541800059X File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: Revised version, 2016 Number: 1601 Classification-JEL: C72, D82, D83 Keywords: Legislative Committees; Strategic Information Transmission; Laboratory Experiment Handle: RePEc:ntw:wpaper:1601 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Benjamin Bernard Author-Name-First: Benjamin Author-Name-Last: Bernard Author-Email: benbernard@ntu.edu.tw Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, National Taiwan University Author-Name: Agostino Capponi Author-Name-First:Agostino Author-Name-Last: Capponi Author-Email: ac3827@columbia.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, Columbia University Author-Name: Joseph E. Stiglitz Author-Name-First: Joseph E. Author-Name-Last: Stiglitz Author-Email: jes322@gsb.columbia.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Columbia Business School,Columbia University Title: Bail-ins and Bail-outs: Incentives, Connectivity, and Systemic Stability Abstract: This paper endogenizes intervention in financial crises as the strategic negotiation between a regulator and creditors of distressed banks. Incentives for banks to contribute to a voluntary bail-in arise from their exposure to credit and price-mediated contagion. In equilibrium, a bail-in is possible only if the regulator's threat to not bail out insolvent banks is credible. Contrary to models without intervention or government bailouts only, sparse networks are beneficial in our model for two main reasons: they improve the credibility of the regulator's no-bailout threat for large shocks and they reduce free-riding incentives among bail-in contributors when the threat is credible. Length: 87 pages Creation-Date: 2017-10 Revision-Date: 2019-10 Publication-Status: Revised and resubmitted to Journal of Political Economy File-URL: http://140.112.36.98:10080/uploads/asset/data/5dafbbb548b8a17fcd014833/bernard-capponi-stiglitz-2019.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: Revised version, 2019 Number: 1901 Keywords: Financial markets, Financial regulation and banking Handle: RePEc:ntw:wpaper:1901 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Federico Revelli Author-Name-First: Federico Author-Name-Last: Revelli Author-Email: federico.revelli@unito.it Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics and Statistics "S. Cognetti de Martiis," University of Torino, Campus Luigi Einaudi Author-Name: Tsung-Sheng Tsai Author-Name-First:Tsung-Sheng Author-Name-Last: Tsai Author-Email: tstsai@ntu.edu.tw Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, National Taiwan University Author-Name: Roberto Zotti Author-Name-First: Roberto Author-Name-Last: Zotti Author-Email: roberto.zotti@unito.it Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics and Statistics "S. Cognetti de Martiis," University of Torino, Campus Luigi Einaudi Title: Fiscal externalities in multilevel tax structures: Evidence from concurrent income taxation Abstract: This paper exploits the multi-tiered structure of personal income taxation in Italy to investigate within-tier (horizontal) and between-tiers (vertical and diagonal) fiscal externalities. Estimation of an unrestricted income tax reaction function on municipalities located at internal regional borders using off-border Wald-type grouping variables as well as the staggered schedule of mayoral elections as instruments for endogenous spatial lags reveals strong positive spatial dependence in municipal tax rates. On the other hand, there is no evidence of a response of municipal tax rates to regional tax policies, suggesting that border discontinuity estimators that rely on consolidated spatial specifications (lower-plus-upper-tier tax rates) impose restrictions on the parameters of the reaction function that are unwarranted in these circumstances. Length: 34 pages Creation-Date: 2022-01 Revision-Date: 2022-01 Publication-Status: first version File-URL: https://econ.ntu.edu.tw/uploads/asset/data/6220121d48b8a16a11003217/NTU_Working_Paper_No._2201.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: First version, 2022 Number: 2201 Keywords: fiscal externalities; income taxation; grouping instrumental variable; border discontinuity estimator Handle: RePEc:ntw:wpaper:2201 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Chih-Sheng Hsieh Author-Name-First: Chih-Sheng Author-Name-Last: Hsieh Author-Email: cshsieh@ntu.edu.tw Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, National Taiwan University Author-Name: Michael D König Author-Name-First:Michael D. Author-Name-Last: König Author-Email: m.d.konig@vu.nl Author-Workplace-Name: Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London Author-Name: Xiaodong Liu Author-Name-First: Xiaodong Author-Name-Last: Liu Author-Email: xiaodong.liu@colorado.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of Colorado Boulder Author-Name: Christian Zimmermann Author-Name-First: Christian Author-Name-Last: Zimmermann Author-Email: zimmermann@stlouisfed.org Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economic Research, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Title: Collaboration in Bipartite Networks Abstract: This paper studies the impact of collaboration on research output. First, we build a micro-founded model for scientific knowledge production, where collaboration between researchers is represented by a bipartite network. The Nash equilibrium of the game incorporates both the complementarity effect between collaborating researchers and the substitutability effect between concurrent projects of the same researcher. Next, we propose a Bayesian MCMC procedure to estimate the structural parameters, taking into account the endogenous participation of researchers in projects. Finally, we illustrate the empirical relevance of the model by analyzing the coauthorship network of economists registered in the RePEc Author Service. The estimated complementarity and substitutability effects are both positive and significant when the endogenous matching between researchers and projects is controlled for, and are downward biased otherwise. To show the importance of correctly estimating the structural model in policy evaluation, we conduct a counterfactual analysis of research incentives. We find that the effectiveness of research incentives tends to be understated when the complementarity effect is ignored and overstated when the substitutability effect is ignored. Length: 50 pages Creation-Date: 2022-02 Revision-Date: 2022-02 Publication-Status: first version File-URL: https://econ.ntu.edu.tw/uploads/asset/data/6228099248b8a169cf0001f8/NTU_Working_Paper_No._2202.pdf File-Format: Application/pdf File-Function: First version, 2022 Number: 2202 Keywords: bipartite networks, coauthorship networks, research collaboration, spillovers, economics of science Handle: RePEc:ntw:wpaper:2202